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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

24 September 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

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1. NIC/Admin

[Signature]

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3. D/S 4 E 60

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SEP 30 1980

[Signature]

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OS 0 2475

REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING

1. Title of Presentation & Nature of Meeting:

China Today. Presentation to faculty members of University of Michigan's China Institute. Also possible participation in Michel Oksenberg's seminar on contemporary China

2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting:

China Institute, University of Michigan; title as above

3. Location:

Ann Arbor, Michigan

4. Time: 3 Oct 1980 (6 Oct for seminar)5. Name and Position of NIC Requester:

STAT

[Redacted] ANIO/EA

6. Identified as CIA? Yes Agency-sponsored? No7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx): None8. ~~Classified~~ Unclassified (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)9. Other Pertinent Information:

STAT

APPROVE:

[Redacted]

(Chairman, National Intelligence Council)

24 Sept 80
(Date)

STAT

CONCUR:

[Redacted]

(Coordinator for Academic Relations)

24 Sept 80
(Date)

STAT

CONCUR:

[Redacted]

(Director of Security)

30 Sept 1980
(Date)

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ational Intelligence Officers

2 September 1980

NOTE FOR: C/NIC

SUBJECT : Your Meeting with DIA on the
North Korean Estimate

I learned this morning that the DIO
STAT for East Asia, [redacted] will
be on leave this week. My guess would
STAT be that [redacted] would probably not
STAT want to meet with you in [redacted]
absence to approve the initiation of an
Estimate. In any case, we will have
early this week a brief, general terms of
reference for the proposed paper and a
suggested schedule for its production.

STAT

[redacted]
A/NIO/EA



cc: A/NIO/W

3 September 1980

Charlie:

I can conceive of two topics which might be considered as issues for NFAC research in the coming year. Neither is truly high priority but each would, I believe, stimulate the development of lines of research that could be better integrated than is presently the case. Such, I understand is the objective of the issues call.

STAT



STA

5 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM:

[REDACTED]

Assistant NIO for East Asia

SUBJECT : The Special Report for the President

1. As a follow on to the 4 September staff meeting discussion on the Special Report, I'd like to offer the following comments and observations. I agree completely with those who argue that the content of such a report ought to be substantially broader than the material contained in the monthly warning statements. Indeed, such a report probably should be focused on issues, developments, and trends we perceive as having impact on US interests and policies within the coming year or that may call for new policy initiatives or action over the longer term. I have sketched below some tentative examples of such issues from the perspective of NIO/EA but first I want to suggest a way of formulating the report.

2. One approach would be to have each NIO draft a personal statement on the issues he sees emerging in the next year or so that should be of interest or concern to the White House and which, for whatever reason, are currently not on the front burner or being focused on in the most effective way by the policymakers. These could, as suggested at the meeting, be developed in the context of the monthly warning meetings but they should be a personal NIO effort, reflecting his ongoing dialogue within the policy establishment. The proposed issues need not be supported with extensive analysis but they should form the basis of a NIC staff meeting with the objective of debating their utility and ultimately selecting a few for an initial report to the DCI and through him to the White House.

3. By having the issues committed to paper prior to the meeting each NIO will be prepared to debate the package thus achieving the sort of substantive, collegial discussion you hoped to achieve in these meetings. Realistically there will be too many issues to deal with at any one meeting and thus you may want to ask that each list be either limited or prioritized so that the discussion can be structured.

4. The process of selection of the issues will be a subjective judgment of the group and require strong direction from the chair. In the first go round there should be a wealth to choose from. Once some issues

are chosen it will be incumbent on the NIO to provide the analytic underpinnings for his issue and, as appropriate, to include statements about major papers or estimates that are scheduled which will shed additional light on the problem. In this way, we may also develop an audience for some of our most important products and commit ourselves to keeping a set schedule.

5. There will, of course, be many issues not selected in the first round. Most of these will probably remain valid and can be reviewed together with new submissions at subsequent meetings. What you want to avoid is simply having a sterile list that is routinely reviewed. To keep the process dynamic, it will be important to have each of the NIOs provide a monthly statement updating the original list or stating that there are no new issues he would choose to add.

6. I would propose that the second meeting of each month be devoted to the issue review and selection and that -- depending on the quality of input -- that report to the President be forwarded two weeks later. This need not be a regular schedule. Indeed, giving the crush of events there will be situations in which a more frequent statement may be necessary. Thus, the report should be characterized as a periodic effort by the DCI to set before the President issues of importance he sees looming on the horizon. Our more formal schedule would simply provide the DCI a regular flow of issues which he could choose to forward or not as he sees fit.

7. From the East Asian perspective, I would submit the following topics for consideration which would necessarily have to be expanded into several analytic paragraphs and for which work is or should be scheduled on an NFAC or interagency basis:

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Chrow

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

10 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM :
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT : East Asia Warning Meeting

Following is the agenda for the East Asia Warning Meeting, scheduled for Wednesday, 17 September 1980 at 1400 hours in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters.

China

- NPC Assessment:
- a. How the domestic future look?
 - b. Any changes forthcoming on foreign policy?

Indochina

Military situation in Kampuchea and Laos

South Korea

- a. Domestic reaction to the Chun Government -- the new Cabinet. What role is the military likely to retain?
- b. Outlook for the Constitution -- popular reaction to its content and the Government's handling of the referendum?
- c. Impact of the sentencing of Kim Tae-chung on the ROK domestic and international situation.

North Korea

- a. Reaction to the advent of the Chun regime -- does it presage a harder line toward the South?
- b. Reasons behind cancellation of visit by US academics?
- c. Status of preparations for the Party Congress -- issue of the succession.

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DD/OCO (7 F 17)
D/OCR (2 E 60)
D/OER (4 F 18)
D/OPA (6 G 00)
D/OSR (3 G 00)
D/OGCR (6 F 20)

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[REDACTED]
D/OSWR (5 F 46)
NFAC/CRES (3 E 65)
OER/DC (4 F 28)
OPA/EA (5 G 29)
C/DDO/EA (5 D 00)

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DDO/ [REDACTED] 0002)
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NCFO
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[REDACTED]
OPA/EA/CH (5 G 22)
OSR/EAP (3 F 45)
OER/IJP (4 G 31)

11 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with [REDACTED]
DIA/DE, for Discussion on Korean Related Issues

25X1 1. I explained to [REDACTED] my principal interest was in
exploring how we might move forward in developing a National level
25X1 paper on the situation in Korea noting that I was familiar with the
correspondence relative to the Warning Estimate over the past several
months. By way of background, [REDACTED] provided a brief summary
on the DIA position noting that his Agency felt there was an outstanding
commitment to provide a Warning Estimate and that in order to do so it
was also imperative to undertake the scenario studies and the follow on
collection studies which had been the subject of correspondence between
DIA and the Agency. He stressed that such an effort could not be
adequately undertaken without interagency participation including CIA
and that at the earliest it would take six months to complete the
package -- nine months was more likely.

25X1 2. I raised with [REDACTED] the possibility of writing a
National Estimate not focused on Warning per se but one that addressed
the balance on the peninsula, the political context of the security
situation, and which also contained a warning statement -- possibly
linked to a completed scenario study or, if the timing were not right,
made reference to its preparation. [REDACTED] had no particular
25X1 problem with this proposal, he stressed that in a Warning context such
an Estimate would have to be viewed as an interim effort which did not
supplant a more elaborate warning statement drawing from the scenario
studies in which, he continued to stress, the CIA should participate.

25X1 3. We both agree that there was a need for a National Estimate
on the Korean balance situation to support the review of the Korean
25X1 withdrawal policy next spring. [REDACTED] noted that DIA was already
heavily engaged in preparing a balance paper and that it would be both
logical and probably feasible for CIA -- as the likely drafting Agency --
25X1 to work closely with DIA perhaps even in a committee drafting sense in
preparing the estimate. [REDACTED] said that he did not believe such
as estimate would really break any new ground. Its prime utility would
be offering a National statement timed for the Korean withdrawal review.

25X1 4. I told [] that the proposal on the Estimate outlined
25X1 above would be presented to [] by C/NIC on 18 September. He
25X1 noted that [] would be in Korea at that time and if agreement
25X1 was reached to support the production of the Estimate it would be useful
to have [] explore some of the likely questions to be developed in
the paper while he was in Seoul.

25X1 5. I then moved on to the proposal for carving up responsibility
for indepth analysis of North Korean ground forces analysis advanced by
OSR in its memorandum of 28 August. I broached the subject by asking for
an analysis of how the analytic work load in DIA was being expended and
if, in [] view, adequate attention and depth was being given
to developments in the ground force area. He was generally positive about
the capacity of DIA to keep abreast of developments recognizing that there
were a number of specialized studies underway which tended to divert
research resources and that the tendency to relax after a period of intense
effort as in the past several years could ultimately contribute to a
decline in capability. I then outlined in general terms the OSR proposal
for a HAT TRICK like approach to the problem involving DIA, CIA and INSCOM.
His initial reaction was negative on two scores -- he did not believe that
CIA had the resources to carry its weight in such a division of labor and
he also had great concern in authorizing the Army to have prime responsibility
for a portion of North Korean analysis. On the latter point his reservations
related to the fact that the Army would simply not be objective in offering
its analysis -- a problem he allowed DIA was now facing with an increased
analytic effort by US Forces Korea. After further discussion []
agreed with my proposal that there was some merit in discussing the issue
in greater detail and that all the anticipated participants in such an
effort should be involved. We reached no specific conclusions but it was
clear from our conversation that if we chose to outline the issue and
propose a discussion on the OSR proposal DIA would be willing to participate
but with the reservations noted above.

25X1 6. On the Estimate, we left it that C/NIC's meeting with [] on
the 18th would provide the formal position on whether or not we went
forward and that on the second issue he would be hearing from us after
some further internal deliberation.

Distribution

C/NIC

OSR []

A-NIO/W

NIO/EA

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

17 September 1980

NOTE FOR:

FROM

:

NIO for East Asia

Attached for your comments is the draft of the assumptions section. I will shortly circulate the section on problems posed for the Agency based on these assumptions, which will use the rest of the contributions you submitted.

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

22 September 1980

NOTE FOR:

FROM :



NIO FOR East Asia

Attached for your comments is the draft
of the problem section for the Long Range
Planning.

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File Clinton

REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING

1. Title of Presentation & Nature of Meeting:

Participation on a panel on Korea as one of two discussants of the papers to be delivered on 'The Comparative Foreign Policies of North and South Korea'.

2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting: International Studies Association annual meeting

3. Location: Philadelphia

4. Time: March 1981

5. Name and Position of NIC Requester:

NIO/CH-EAP Office

6. Identified as CIA? yes Agency-sponsored? no

7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx): round-trip transportation to Philadelphia and per diem expenses for two days

8. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Classified/Unclassified (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)

9. Other Pertinent Information:

Professor Kwak of Eastern Kentucky University is organizing the panel. Two of the papers will be given by Korean professors from Seoul, one of whom teaches at the Korean Defense College and is an army colonel, and the other two papers by Korean-American professors in the US.

(Chairman, National Intelligence Council)

(Date)

CONCUR:

(Coordinator for Academic Relations)

(Date)

CONCUR:

(Director of Security)

(Date)

REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING

1. Title of Presentation & Nature of Meeting:

China Today. Presentation to faculty members of University of Michigan's China Insitute. Also possible participation in Michel Oksenberg's seminar on contemporary China

2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting:

China Insitute, University of Michigan; title as above

3. Location: Ann Arbor, Michigan

4. Time: 3 Oct 1980 (6 Oct for seminar)

5. Name and Position of NIC Requester:

ANIO/EA

6. Identified as CIA? Yes Agency-sponsored? No

7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx): None

8. ~~Classified~~Unclassified (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)

9. Other Pertinent Information:

APPROVE:

(Chairman, National Intelligence Council)

24 Sept 80
(Date)

CONCUR:

(Coordinator for Academic Relations)

24 Sept 80
(Date)

CONCUR:


(Director of Security)

(Date)

National Intelligence Officers

24 September 1980

STAT
NOTE FOR:



FROM :

for East Asia

Your inputs and comments are requested in preparing the next section of the long range planning. Include your thoughts on how to improve the situation assuming there is no increase in the budget; what you would like to do provided there were funds available; and your recommendation of the program management changes, if any, regardless of the funds situation.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

19 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning *BP/jn*

FROM : [redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: East Asia

The following items were discussed by the Community Representatives at the 17 September Warning Meeting.

Korea

1. Analysts generally agreed that the imposition of the death sentence on Kim Tae-chung poses a serious dilemma for President Chon Tu-hwan and has important implications for the stability of his government. If, as reporting has indicated, Chon is prepared to ultimately commute the sentence after a period of judicial review, he still must cope with international reaction to the sentencing. In making a decision on the case Chon must also take into account that some of his strongest military supporters are opposed to commutation while others in the senior military and political ranks feel strongly that it was in Korea's long-term interest, particularly with regard to the US, to keep Kim alive. Chon will be making his decision at the same time he is attempting to consolidate his political power, reduce or redirect the military's role in the running of the country, and move the nation forward on an ambitious political schedule which includes a Constitutional referendum next month and ultimately elections next year. Analysts pointed out that it took Pak Chong-hui almost two years to complete a similar schedule. [redacted]

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analysts generally believe that the situation may represent only a snowballing of uncoordinated activity developing in part in anticipation of the anniversary of martial law on 21 September. Marcos has greatly heightened security and the general populace seems to support such security measures. If they do not prove effective and the pattern of random violence spreads and intensifies the situation will require a much more serious evaluation. In turn, much more information on the nature and scope of the terrorist/oppositionist activity will be needed.

China

7. Analysts generally concluded that the changes brought about by the National Peoples Congress augured well for stability in China's domestic affairs and for general consistency in Beijing's foreign policy. Particular note was made of the evidence stemming from the Congress of the persistent strains between the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party and the pragmatic recognition that problems in resource allocation are real and must be dealt with. This was not viewed as a destabilizing factor but rather an evolutionary aspect of China's modernization. The failure to name a new defense minister was noted as suggesting continued difficulties in completing the realignment of the leadership.

China-Vietnam

8. Recent statements by the Chinese suggesting a willingness to negotiate the Kampuchean situation without Vietnamese withdrawal as a prerequisite were seen largely as tactical moves and set in a context that would, in any case, be unacceptable to Hanoi. Analysts did take note, however, of what appears to be increased Chinese disaffection with the DK, and an inclination to explore the broadening of the political base opposed to the Heng Samrin Government. Beijing was not prepared to make any significant moves away from the DK in the near term. There was however a general feeling expressed that the Chinese may well begin to seek broader options after the UN vote in recognition of the declining international support of the DK. There was no indication that Beijing's military posture along the border with Vietnam had altered significantly in recent weeks or that the threat of hostilities along the border had increased.

Kampuchea

9. Vietnam has increased its forces along the border with Thailand over the past several weeks by as much as two divisions. This includes augmentation of AAA and improved command and control. Military activity has, however, been relatively low partly because of the apparent Vietnamese desire to avoid any action that could complicate their efforts at the UN on the Kampuchean seating issue. The augmentation on the border is seen as intended to influence Thai political attitudes as well as to

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heighten control of infiltration routes. The Vietnamese may also be attempting to preempt any attempt by the DK forces to initiate significant military activity. The Vietnamese remain in a strong position to carry out military operations inside Thailand. [REDACTED]

25X

10. DK forces appear to be consolidating along the northern border with Thailand in Preah Vihear province. Significant quantities of food and ammunition have been reported transiting the border in this area suggesting either that the DK are planning significant operations in this region which does not have a strong Vietnamese presence or simply that they are seeking a safe base. The DK have had some success in carrying out limited military actions in the interior including in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. [REDACTED]

25X1

Laos

11. There has been no significant change in the military situation in Laos. Chinese propaganda statements suggesting greater involvement in the area have not as yet been borne out by any action. [REDACTED]

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19 Sept 80

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